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Death Be Not Strange. The Montreal
Convention’s Mislabeling of Human




This article discusses Article 22 of the Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air
(“The Montreal Convention”) and its impact on the transporta-
tion of human remains.  The Convention limits carrier liability to
a sum of 19 Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) per kilogram in the
case of destruction, loss, damage or delay of part of the cargo or
of any object contained therein.  Transportation of human re-
mains falls under Article 22 which forecloses any recovery for
pain and suffering unaccompanied by physical injury.  This Arti-
cle finds fault with this liability limit.  The Article notes that if a
plaintiff were to bring a claim against a carrier for mishandling of
human remains, recovery will be limited to the weight of the
corpse and the casket in kilograms, multiplied by 19 SDRs.  This
leads to the absurd result of recovering more for a heavy corpse
and/or casket versus a light one.  The Article argues that by clas-
sifying human remains as ordinary cargo thus applying ordinary
cargo rules, The Montreal Convention as generally applied is in-
human and absurd.
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INTRODUCTION
On May 12, 2017, a southern California man buried the body
of an individual he thought was his late son.  Eighty-two-year-old
Frank J. Kerrigan is father to fifty-seven-year-old Frank M. Kerri-
gan, who has mental problems and was homeless at the time he was
declared deceased.  Father Frank J. Kerrigan received a call from
the Orange County Coroner’s office that indicated his son’s dead
body had been found behind a Verizon Wireless store.  The office
told him the body had been identified and confirmed through fin-
gerprint analysis.  In actuality, the police merely corroborated a
statement that the body looked like Kerrigan’s son by reviewing an
old driver’s license photo.  But Kerrigan and his family were not
privy to this identification process.  The family collected the body,
which had a full head of wavy-brown-gray hair and looked about
the right age, and they held a burial ceremony.  Dozens of people
attended the funeral.1
One night in late May, Frank J. received a call from a family
friend who told him that his son was in fact alive.  The county coro-
ner officials misidentified the body.2  It later turned out the body
the Kerrigan family buried was that of John Dean Dickens, a man
1. Avik Selk, A Grieving Father Buried a Man He Thought Was His Son—
Who Turned Up Alive a Week Later, WASH. POST, June 25, 2017, https://wapo.st/
30zg9QT [https://perma.cc/GG4Y-VB2S].
2. Id.
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who disappeared from Kansas nearly 30 years earlier, and who, like
Kerrigan’s son, had mental health problems and was homeless.3
Reasonable people may agree that the Kerrigan family has a
strong case against the Orange County Coroner’s office, most likely
for a violation of Frank M. Kerrigan’s civil rights,4 negligence, and
emotional distress.  Now consider the following unreported case.
Mr. Obi,5 a naturalized U.S. citizen who was born in Africa, died in
the United States after a long illness.  His body was embalmed at a
funeral home.  His family decided to inter his remains in his country
of birth.6  The family paid the funeral home for embalming and air
transportation services.
The funeral home contracted with a freight company, which in
turn contracted with an international airline to fly Mr. Obi’s re-
mains to Africa.  Mr. Obi’s body was flown from the United States
to an international airport in Europe en route to Africa.  Mr. Obi’s
family members arrived at the local airport expecting to pick up
Obi’s body, which was to be buried later during the week.  All bur-
ial arrangements had been made, including funeral services, flow-
ers, food, and final rites befitting a man of his status.7
The family waited for Mr. Obi’s remains at the airport terminal
for several hours, but when the flight arrived, his body was nowhere
to be found.  As family members began to panic, they called the
funeral home in the United States to find out what happened.  The
funeral home manager called the freight company, which in turn
contacted the airline.  An airline representative stated that because
of an international health pandemic, there were travel restrictions
on flying human remains to Mr. Obi’s country of origin without a
special waiver issued from that country’s Ministry of Health.  After
a couple days, the family received a call from an airline representa-
tive who told them Mr. Obi’s casket had arrived and was ready for
3. See Lives of Families Intertwined After Orange County Coroner’s Office
Burial Mix-Up, CNN WIRE (July, 23, 2017, 4:14 PM), https://bit.ly/2LHYX7r [https:/
/perma.cc/7ESU-KRKM].
4. Kerrigan’s lawyer filed a notice of claim—a precursor to a lawsuit—against
Orange County.  This notice stated “[t]he lawsuit will argue that [Kerrigan’s son’s]
civil rights were violated because the Coroner’s Office did not make adequate ef-
forts to determine if the body was in fact his because he is homeless.”  Scott
Schwebke, Man Believed Dead Is Alive: Family Buries Wrong Person After Mix-up
By Coroner’s Office, ORANGE CTY. REG. (July 13, 2017, 9:04 PM), https://bit.ly/
2S4W9Cj [https://perma.cc/SN96-TW36].
5. The name of the deceased in this case has been changed to protect the
family’s privacy.
6. For privacy purposes, Africa here refers to both the Continent and Mr.
Obi’s country of birth.  No substantive change is made by this designation.
7. Obi was a well-known and respected member of his tribe, despite his many
years of living in the United States.
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pick up.  The family hired a hearse and drove to the airport to pick
up Mr. Obi.  The casket was promptly delivered to the family mem-
bers, but there was one big problem: The casket contained the
wrong body.  Rather than containing Mr. Obi, the casket contained
the remains of a woman who died somewhere in Europe and was
mistakenly flown to Africa.  There was panic at the airport.
After extensive consultations, the airline finally located Mr.
Obi’s casket in airport storage in Europe and flew it to Africa.  The
casket arrived approximately five days later.  Mr. Obi’s body was
swollen, had a foul odor of decomposition, and leaked fluid.  The
family members were unable to view the body in its putrid condi-
tion.  Mr. Obi’s widow suffered mental anguish, anxiety, worry,
shock, and fright.  His children, who by now had flown to Africa to
bury their father, were inconsolable.8
Will Mr. Obi’s American family have any causes of action for
pain and suffering against the airline in U.S. courts?  In contrast to
the Kerrigan family’s case,9 and according to the Montreal Conven-
tion, the answer is surprisingly no.10  This raises the following ques-
tion: Why is U.S. law willing to provide a remedy for the emotional
distress suffered by those whose loved ones’ remains have been
mishandled in the United States11 but not for those whose loved
ones’ remains have been mishandled abroad or en route to or from
the United States?  One part of the problem is the Montreal Con-
vention, specifically, its treatment of human remains as cargo.
8. The facts of this case are eerily similar to those in Onyeanusi v. Pan Am.
World Airways, Inc., 952 F.2d 788, 789 (3d Cir. 1992).  The case involved a suit
against Pan American Airways for the mishandling of human remains that were
transported from New York to Nigeria. See infra Part V.
9. The import of Frank Kerrigan’s case to this paper is to show that the state
courts would offer adequate remedy in the mishandling of human remains, where
the federal courts would not under the Montreal Convention.
10. See McKay Cunningham, The Montreal Convention: Can Passengers Fi-
nally Recover for Mental Injuries?, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1043, 1046 (2008).
The author notes:
In 1999, representatives from 121 states convened in Montreal, Canada,
not to amend Warsaw, but to replace it with a new international treaty.
Recovery for “mental injury in the absence of accompanying physical in-
jury” was a primary objective and was listed as a condition to the United
States’ participation.  Although a clear majority of states voiced approval
for mental injury recovery, the new treaty somehow retained the 1929
Warsaw limitation of “bodily injury.”
Id.
11. See generally VICTOR SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND
SCHWARTZ’S TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS, 470–71 (12th ed. 2010) (collecting
cases on actions for mental anguish based on negligent interference with dead
bodies).
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This paper argues that the current state of the law is unfair for
passengers alleging emotional distress unaccompanied by physical
injury against international air carriers under the Montreal Conven-
tion (“the Convention”).  This unfairness not only arises from the
Convention’s foreclosure of emotional distress recovery, but it is
also exemplified by the nature of shipping contracts under the Con-
vention.  As an example, Article 22 limits carrier liability to a sum
of 19 Special Drawing Rights (“SDR”) per kilogram in the case of
destruction, loss, damage, or delay of part of the cargo or of any
object contained therein.  Article 22 further states the total weight
of the relevant package(s) is the only weight to be considered in
determining carrier liability.  Therefore, if a plaintiff were to bring a
claim against a carrier for mishandling human remains, his or her
recovery will be limited to the weight of the corpse and the casket
in kilograms multiplied by 19 SDR.  This leads to the absurd result
of recovering more for a heavy corpse and casket versus a lighter
corpse and casket.  For example, petitioners would seemingly re-
cover more for a dead adult than they would for a dead infant sim-
ply on the basis of weight.  Also consider Judaism, which
discourages ostentatious funerals and stipulates that a traditional
Jewish coffin be made of plain wood.12  Would the recovery for
such a casket be less?  Could this be considered religious discrimi-
nation?  Surely the drafters of the Convention would not have in-
tended such an unfair result.
Part I introduces a case of a parent in California who buried
the wrong body after the county coroner misidentified the decedent
as the parent’s child.  The import of the story is that state courts
would offer an adequate remedy for the mishandling of human re-
mains, whereas the federal courts would not under the Convention.
Part II provides a brief discussion of the articles of the Convention,
noting limits on liabilities for the airlines.  Part III discusses the
number of Americans who die outside of the United States and
identifies some of the difficulties associated with shipping the re-
mains of U.S. citizens who die abroad.  Part IV describes the Con-
vention’s conceptualization of human remains as cargo, even
though the Convention itself neither contains nor defines the term
“human remains.”  Part V identifies and analyzes federal cases that
have conceptualized human remains as cargo in lawsuits seeking
emotional distress damages against international air carriers under
both the Warsaw Convention and the Montreal Convention.  This
12. WILLIAM CUTTER, THE JEWISH MOURNER’S HANDBOOK, 17 (Behrman
House Inc., 1992).
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part further notes that a number of federal courts of appeal, in ad-
dressing negligence complaints regarding the mishandling of human
remains in international flights, have grappled with how to address
such emotional distress claims; most denying any relief for pain and
suffering.  Part VI compares the federal scheme with state laws on
the mishandling of human remains, pointing out that various states
recognize emotional distress claims resulting from such mishandling
without physical manifestation of injury.  Part VII addresses the
choice of law conflicts involved in negligence claims emanating
from the mishandling of human remains.  The distinction between
contract law and tort law is usually blurred in such cases.  As an
example, Article 22 of the Convention provides that if the con-
signor has declared the cargo at a higher value, the carrier is liable
for that higher value.  But how can one declare a higher value for
human remains?  Part VIII provides suggested approaches to
resolving recovery difficulties and disparities, including the need for
federal courts to interpret the Convention in a way that avoids
anomalous results and the need for carriers to apply common sense
measures designed to minimize loss, delay, or destruction of human
remains.  To conclude, Part IX indicates the Montreal Convention’s
classification of human remains as cargo and application of ordi-
nary cargo recovery rules is both inhuman and absurd.
I. THE MONTREAL CONVENTION
The Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for Inter-
national Carriage by Air was adopted in 1999 in Montreal, Canada.
Also known as the Montreal Convention, it applies to all interna-
tional carriage of persons, baggage, or cargo performed by an air-
craft for reward.13  It currently has 136 state signatories, including
the United States.14
The Convention serves as the successor to the Warsaw Con-
vention, a very similar treaty introduced in 1934.15  “The Warsaw
Convention is an international treaty designed to obtain uniformity
13. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Car-
riage by Air, art. 1(1), May 28, 1999, 2242 U.N.T.S. 309, https://bit.ly/2JHoDi2
[https://perma.cc/8E8B-3ULC] [hereinafter Montreal Convention].
14. INT’L CIV. AVIATION ORG. (ICAO), Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air Done at Montreal on 28 May 1999,
1, 1 (1991), https://bit.ly/2tXkBrT [https://perma.cc/4NRR-2NGW] [hereinafter
Convention for Unification].
15. Allison Stewart, Note, The Montreal Convention’s Statute of Limitations—
A Failed Attempt at Consistency, 80 J. AIR L. & COM. 267, 268 (2015).
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among international air carriers in transportation transactions.”16
The drafters of the Convention intended for it to replace predeces-
sor treaties governing this area, including the Warsaw Conven-
tion.17  In fact, Article 55 of the Montreal Convention specifies that
it shall prevail over any rules which apply to international carriage
by air between state parties to the Convention by virtue of those
states being party to one of the following: (a) Warsaw Convention,
(b) Hague Protocol, (c) Guadalajara Convention, (d) Guatemala
City Protocol, or (e) Montreal Protocols.18
The Convention is divided into 57 articles.  Briefly, Article 1
states that the Convention applies to international carriage of per-
sons, baggage, or cargo performed by an aircraft for reward.  Arti-
cle 2 notes that the Convention applies to carriage performed by
the State or by legally constituted public bodies.  Articles 3 through
13 cover passengers, baggage, cargo, and documentary require-
ments, as well as the enforcement of rights of consignor and con-
signee.  Article 16 requires a consignor to furnish information and
documents necessary to meet the formalities of customs, police, and
any other public authorities.  Article 17, one of the most litigated
sections of the Convention,19 defines conditions for airline liability
for harm to passengers and baggage.  It provides that “[t]he carrier
is liable for damage sustained in case of death or bodily injury of a
passenger upon condition only that the accident which caused the
death or injury took place on board the aircraft or in the course of
any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.”20  This Arti-
cle further contains rules for carrier liability in the case of destruc-
tion, loss of, or damage to, checked baggage.  Articles 18 and 19 lay
out the rules for damage and delay to cargo, and Article 20 exoner-
ates the carrier if it proves the damage was caused or contributed to
by the negligence of the person claiming compensation.
Articles 21 and 22 set out liability limits.21  The amounts are
expressed in SDR, an international “currency” established by the
International Monetary Fund.  The value of the SDR is calculated
16. Onyeanusi v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 767 F. Supp. 654, 654 (E.D.
Penn. 1990).
17. Marty F. Elfenbein & Katherine A. Roberts, Stranded: Navigating Avia-
tion Delay Damages Under the Montreal Convention, 88 FLA. BAR J. 20, 20 (2014).
18. Montreal Convention art. 55(1).
19. As of June 5, 2019, a search of the phrase “Article 17 of Montreal Con-
vention” under the federal cases directory in Westlaw shows approximately 99 re-
sults.  The same search on Lexis Nexis results in 103 federal cases.  The seminal
case discussing Article 17 (of the Warsaw Convention) is Air France v. Saks, 470
U.S. 392 (1985).  As of the time of writing, it has been cited 2,296 times.
20. Montreal Convention art. 17(1).
21. See Convention for Unification, supra note 14, at 13.
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in reference to a selection of the major currencies in the world’s
trading and financial systems.  This selection includes the U.S. dol-
lar (USD), Euro, Japanese Yen, Chinese Renminbi, and Pound
Sterling.  One SDR has an approximate value of 0.582 USD.22  Ar-
ticle 22 preserves the limits of liability in relation to delay, baggage,
and cargo.  Paragraph 1 sets a 4,150 SDR limit on damages caused
by delay in the carriage of passengers.  This figure has since been
adjusted to 4,694 SDR.23  Paragraph 2 limits carrier liability for de-
struction, loss, damage, or delay to a sum of 19 SDR per kilogram.
Additionally, in the case of destruction, loss, damage, or delay of
part of the cargo or of any object contained therein, only the total
weight of the relevant package(s) will be considered in determining
carrier liability.  Paragraph 5 denies carriers the protection of the
liability limitations of paragraphs 1 (passenger delay) and 2 (bag-
gage) if the carrier, its servants, or its agents, acting within the
scope of their employment, have caused the damage intentionally
or recklessly with knowledge that damage would probably result.
Consistent with Article 22(5) of the Convention, this willful miscon-
duct exception to the liability limits does not appear to apply to
cargo.24  Paragraph 6 is a settlement inducement provision that al-
lows fees to be recovered, but if the settlement offer is greater than
liability, it does not apply.25
Article 23 specifies conversion rates for SDR, and Article 24
provides for a five-year review of the rates based on inflation.26  Ar-
ticle 25 allows the carrier to stipulate to higher limits or no limits to
the Convention’s liabilities.  Articles 26 through 28 define contrac-
tual provisions, freedom to contract, and advance payment in the
event of passenger death or injury.  Articles 29 and 30 provide for
the basis and aggregation of claims.  Article 31 requires a timely
notice of complaint to the carrier:  within 14 days in the case of
damage to cargo and 21 days in the case of delay.  Article 32 allows
for the cause of action to survive the person liable.  Article 33, the
jurisdictional provision, allows a plaintiff to bring a cause of action
where the carrier is incorporated, where it has its principal place of
22. Special Drawing Right (SDR) Factsheet, INT’L MONETARY FUND (Mar. 8,
2019), https://bit.ly/2omUhHL [https://perma.cc/G2YA-X56W].
23. Inflation Adjustments to Liability Limits Governed by Montreal Conven-
tion Effective December 30, 2009, 74 Fed. Reg. 59,017, 59,017 (Nov. 16, 2009).
24. Montreal Convention art. 22(5).
25. Montreal Convention art. 22(6).
26. See Inflation Adjustments to Liability limits Governed by Montreal Con-
vention Effective Dec. 30, 2009, 74 Fed. Reg. at 59,017 (“Under Article 24 of the
Convention, ICAO is to review those limits every five years in light of inflation
that has occurred during that period.”).
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business, or where the plaintiff permanently resides (so long as the
carrier provides service to that country).  Article 34 concerns arbi-
tration.  Article 35 defines the statute of limitations and provides
that the right to damages shall be extinguished if an action is not
brought within a period of two years.  Articles 36 and 37 define
rights for actions against successive carriers and third parties.  Arti-
cle 38 covers parties in combined carriage.  Articles 39 through 48
lay out the rights of passengers where all or part of the carriage is
provided by a person other than the contracting carrier or an airline
not party to the contract or mutual liabilities.  Article 49 voids any
clauses and agreements infringing upon the Convention.  Article 50
requires carriers to maintain adequate insurance.  Article 51 ex-
empts documentation requirements when carriage is performed in
extraordinary circumstances.  Article 52 defines calendar days.  Ar-
ticles 53 through 57 deal with ratification, denunciation, relation to
other Conventions, and reservations that allow states to exempt
government flights (including military aircrafts) from the applica-
tion of the Convention.27
How much does the Convention affect Americans?  Since
2003, the Montreal Convention has governed flights between the
United States and other signatories.28  According to the National
Travel and Tourism Office, in 2016 approximately 80,226,167 Amer-
ican citizens traveled to international regions.29  Most Americans
flying overseas are likely oblivious of the Montreal Convention, be-
cause most flights are relatively safe.  But when one’s luggage is lost
or damaged in an international flight or when one is injured on the
aircraft or while boarding or landing, the Convention comes into
play.  The Convention has perhaps its greatest impact when an
American dies abroad.  A brief discussion of American deaths
abroad will illustrate this point.
II. AMERICAN DEATHS ABROAD
In 2001, the U.S. Census Bureau informed Congress that it did
not have an accurate estimate of the total number of Americans
living abroad.  The U.S. Census Bureau further noted that the U.S.
Department of State does not officially track either the number or
27. Convention for Unification, supra note 14.
28. WILLIAM B. BOONE & PAUL PEYRAT, CAL. TORT GUIDE § 2.22 (3d ed.
2019).
29. U.S. DEP’T COM., U.S. CITIZEN TRAVEL TO INTERNATIONAL REGIONS
(2017), https://bit.ly/2SdsMy0 [https://perma.cc/FBG3-A6XF].
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location of U.S. citizens living in other countries.30  Nevertheless,
the Federal Voting Assistance Program estimated there were 5.7
million U.S. citizens living abroad in 2014.31
With regard to American deaths abroad, the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act of 2003 requires the Secretary of State to “col-
lect, with respect to each foreign country, the following information
with respect to each [U.S.] citizen who dies in that country from a
non[-]natural cause[:]” (1) the date of death, (2) the locality where
the death occurred (including the state or province and municipal-
ity, if available), (3) the cause of death, including information about
the circumstances of the death (and if applicable, a statement indi-
cating the death resulted from an act of terrorism), and (4) such
other information as the Secretary shall prescribe.32
According to most recent figures, approximately 11,855 Ameri-
cans died abroad between October 2002 and December 2016.33
This does not include deaths of military members or government
officials stationed in foreign countries.34  This total is a very small
number considering the number of Americans who live and/or
travel abroad every year.
The relative rarity of American deaths abroad35 offers cold
comfort to those whose loved ones do die on foreign soil.  Gener-
ally, the U.S. Department of State has no funding to assist the re-
turn of the remains or ashes of U.S. citizens who die overseas.36
The next of kin is therefore responsible for the shipment of the re-
mains or ashes.37  Depending on the cause of death, flying a casket
home from a foreign destination can be costly and mired by both
30. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ISSUES OF COUNTING AMERICANS OVERSEAS IN
FUTURE CENSUSES (2001), https://bit.ly/2XVQrbf [https://perma.cc/Y895-NVU9].
31. Fors Marsh Group, Federal Voting Assistance Program Overseas Citizen
Population Analysis 1, 5 (Feb. 2016), https://bit.ly/32m3mTh [https://perma.cc/
K23P-F8ZT].
32. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No.
107–228, §§ 204(a)–(c), 116 Stat. 1363 (2002).
33. Number of U.S. Citizen Deaths Overseas, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://
bit.ly/2FqQNe1 [https://perma.cc/E2KW-KRWA] (select “October” and “2002” in
the ‘from’ category and “December” and “2016” in the ‘to’ category, and then
click search; for a more comprehensive view, download the corresponding file).
34. John Tozzi & Dorothy Gambrell, How Americans Die Abroad, BLOOM-
BERG, (July 27, 2015, 11:43 AM), https://bloom.bg/32g8qJ7 [https://perma.cc/
T3EM-63K4].
35. See generally Jane E. Boon, How Americans Die Abroad, TIME, Mar. 8,
2016, https://bit.ly/2LIvk5M [https://perma.cc/5DPP-6GKY] (noting that when con-
sidering the number of Americans who travel overseas, the yearly death toll is
relatively low).
36. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, DEATH ABROAD, https://bit.ly/2khqDEY [https://
perma.cc/YY73-EALE] (last visited Jan. 20, 2019).
37. See id.
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airline and government regulations.38  For example, despite the
Convention’s attempt at uniformity, the process of handling claims
resulting from international carriage by air is unnecessarily com-
plex.  “[A]n individual flight between any origin and destination
can have passengers and cargo shipments that are subject to the
provisions of different liability regimes.”39  For example, In re Air
Crash at Little Rock Arkansas, June 1, 1999,40 the court wrote:
On June 1, 1999, American Airlines Flight 1420 crashed upon
landing at the Little Rock Airport.  There were 132 passengers
on board the MD-82 jet aircraft.  The pilot and ten passengers
sustained fatal injuries, and most other passengers sustained
some injuries, varying from minor to severe.  Approximately
one-third of the passengers were international and, thus, covered
by the Warsaw Convention.  Most of the litigation arising from
this disaster has been filed in the Eastern District of Arkansas.
However, suits also have been filed in Texas, Illinois, California,
and Hawaii by some passengers.41
Here, passengers in the same aircraft were governed by differ-
ent legal regimes: The international passengers were covered by the
Warsaw Convention, whereas the other non-international passen-
gers were covered by domestic laws (presumably federal common
law and state laws).42  As a result, similarly situated passengers (i.e.,
passengers who suffered the same kind of injury) are treated differ-
ently from one another on the basis of whether they are domestic or
international passengers.  This is absurd.
38. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Guidance for Importa-
tion of Human Remains into the United States for Interment or Subsequent Crema-
tion, (Apr. 9, 2019), https://bit.ly/2YKR04V [https://perma.cc/JH49-WB3]
Human remains intended for interment or cremation after entry into the United
States must be accompanied by a death certificate stating the cause of death . . . If
the cause of death was a quarantinable communicable disease [(i.e., cholera, diph-
theria, infectious tuberculosis, plague, smallpox, yellow fever, viral hemorrhagic
fevers, SARS, or pandemic influenza)], the remains must meet the standards for
importation found in 42 CFR Part 71.55 and may be cleared, released, and author-
ized for entry into the United States only under [certain] conditions.
Id.
39. INT’L CIV. AVIATION ORG. (ICAO), Promotion of the Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air (Montreal Conven-
tion of 1999) 1, 3 (2016), https://bit.ly/2G7rakB [https://perma.cc/JY65-ML6R].
40. In re Air Crash at Little Rock Ark., 109 F. Supp. 2d 1022 (E.D. Ark.,
2000).
41. Id. at 1024.
42. For example, in the same case, the district court ruled that punitive dam-
ages would not be permitted in the cases involving international passengers,
whereas for the domestic passengers, the punitive damages can be obtained if per-
mitted by applicable state law and justified by the evidence. Id. at 1025.
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In addition to this complexity of the Convention, another ques-
tion remains vexing to the courts: Should human remains be classi-
fied as goods?  Under the Warsaw Convention, the consensus was
that human remains are goods.43  This is not as clear under the
Montreal Convention.
III. THE MONTREAL CONVENTION AND HUMAN REMAINS
“If a person dies in a country other than his own, there are no
global rules or guidance that dictates the manner in which his [or
her] remains could be transported back to his [or her] country, with
dignity and care.”44  Generally, each country has different require-
ments regarding the arrangement of transportation for a body ei-
ther embalmed or cremated.  In the United States, the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has issued guidance for
shipping human remains intended for interment (e.g., burial or
placement in a tomb) or cremation after entry into the United
States.45  Some airlines additionally have specific requirements re-
garding the shipping of human remains.
For example, American Airlines’ policy on shipping human re-
mains indicates the following:
“Caskets and alternative containers must be enclosed in an outer
container (air[ ]tray) made of wood, particle board, corrugated
fiberboard, plastic, or other water repellent material, and must
have at least six handles and sufficient rigidity and padding to
protect the inner container and contents from damage by ordi-
nary care and handling.”46
Delta Airlines allows remains to be tendered either embalmed
or unembalmed, a combination thereof, or casketed.47
Finally, Southwest Airlines provides the following:
“[H]uman remains, other than cremated remains, must be ade-
quately secured in a casket, approved metal container, or combi-
nation unit to prevent shifting and escape of offensive odors.  If
43. See Johnson v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 834 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1987); Onyeanusi
v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 952 F.2d 788 (3d Cir. 1992).
44. Ruwantissa Abeyratne, Acceptance of Human Remains for Carriage by
Air—Some Concerns in Security and Safety, 5 J. TRANSP. SECURITY, 305, 305
(2012).
45. Guidance for Importation of Human Remains into the United States for
Interment or Subsequent Cremation, supra note 38.
46. Specialty Shipments/Human Remains, AMERICAN AIRLINES, https://bit.ly/
2FFFrnb [https://perma.cc/FS6H-LU4M] (last visited Sept. 25, 2018).
47. See generally Delta Cares—Funeral Shipments, DELTA AIRLINES, https://
bit.ly/2lLz1ga [https://perma.cc/7CEZ-95JL] (last visited Jan. 20, 2019).
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the remains are in a casket, the casket must be enclosed in an
outside shipping container of wood, canvas, plastic, or paper-
board construction which has at least six (6) handles and suffi-
cient rigidity and padding to protect the casket from damage with
ordinary care in handling.”48
The Convention neither contains nor defines the term “human
remains.”  Rather, this term is found in the International Air Trans-
port Association (“IATA”)49 Airport Handling Manual, which de-
scribes how human remains must be packed for air transport.50  The
term is also found in the International Civil Aviation Organization’s
(“ICAO”)51 proposed adoption of standards for the documentation
and packaging of human remains (created to provide some clear
requirements for the international air transport of human
remains).52
The Convention also does not define the term “cargo.”  As
mentioned in Part II, Articles 4, 5, and 6 (that deal with cargo) dis-
cuss the airway bill and the contents.  Articles 12 and 13 provide for
disposition and delivery of cargo.  Article 18 applies to damages,
and Article 22 applies to limits of liability in relation to delay, bag-
gage, and cargo.  But none of these articles define cargo.
The conceptualization of human remains as cargo has its origin
in Annexes 9 and 18 of the ICAO’s Chicago Convention of 1944.
48. Shipping Human Remains, SOUTHWEST AIRLINES, https://bit.ly/2kgZlP0
[https://perma.cc/SJ58-YFDM] (last visited Jan. 20, 2019).
49. The International Air Transport Association is the trade association for
world’s airlines.  It issues guidelines that are followed by the industry. See About
Us, IATA, https://bit.ly/20UON1O [https://perma.cc/A2FB-345R] (last visited
Sept. 25, 2018).
50. See INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION (IATA), AIRPORT
HANDLING MANUAL 333, Handling of Human Remains 155 (31st ed. Jan. 2011).
This section provides:
Human remains (HUM), except cremated, must be packed in a hermeti-
cally sealed inner containment, which may be constructed of a flexible
material or may be a rigid coffin of lead or zinc.  The inner containment
must then be packed inside a wooden or metal coffin.  The wooden or
metal coffin may be protected from damage by an outer packing and cov-
ered by canvas or tarpaulin so that the nature of its contents is not appar-
ent.  Cremated remains must be shipped in funeral urns which are
efficiently cushioned by suitable packing, against breakage.
Id.
51. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is a UN specialized
agency, established by States in 1944 to manage the administration and governance
of the Convention on International Civil Aviation. About ICAO, INT’L CIV. AVIA-
TION ORG., https://bit.ly/2raCnYr [https://perma.cc/YLH9-ZUS3] (last visited Jan.
20, 2019).
52. See INT’L CIV. AVIATION ORG., Standards Related to the Repatriation of
Human Remains, 1, 1–4 (Oct. 2012), https://bit.ly/2XLCNZn [https://perma.cc/
B4P2-JBVS].
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Annex 9 of the Chicago Convention requires the civil aviation com-
munity to comply with laws governing the inspection of aircraft,
cargo, and passengers by authorities concerned with customs, immi-
gration, agriculture, and public health.53  Annex 18 specifies the
broad standards and recommends following practices to enable the
safe transport of dangerous goods.54  The Annex 9 definition of
cargo implies that human remains could be categorized as such
where cargo is “any property55 carried on an aircraft other than
mail, stores and accompanied[,] or mishandled baggage.”56  Annex
18 does not define the word cargo per se but rather defines a cargo
aircraft as “[a]ny aircraft, other than a passenger aircraft, which is
carrying goods or property.”  Annex 18 also defines dangerous
goods as “[a]rticles or substances which are capable of posing a risk
to health, safety, property[,] or the environment and which are
shown in the list of dangerous goods in the Technical Instructions or
which are classified according to those Instructions.”57  Neither An-
nex 9 nor 18 contains the term “human remains.”
Yet, despite the fact that neither the Convention nor the ICAO
defines human remains as cargo, some federal courts in the United
States have treated human remains as cargo, particularly under the
Warsaw Convention.58  The following cases illustrate this.
IV. FEDERAL CASES
The U.S. Supreme Court has neither been presented with nor
addressed the issue of whether human remains should be treated as
cargo, vel non, under the Montreal Convention.59  Rather, the
53. See ICAO, Facilitation, ANNEX 9 (15th ed. Feb. 2018) https://bit.ly/
32Cj1xV [https://perma.cc/UX58-U48J].
54. ICAO, The Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air, ANNEX 18 (4th
ed. July 2011) https://bit.ly/2M0HMOn [https://perma.cc/FN2D-TDVP].
55. One commentator has noted:
In terms of property rights pertaining to a cadaver or other remains, such
rights do not exist at common law.  However, for purposes of transporta-
tion [—] whether be it for embalming, cremation or internment [—] the
corpse or cremated remains of a human being is considered to be prop-
erty or quasi-property, the rights to which are held by the surviving
spouse or next of kin.
Abeyratne, supra note 44, at 307.
56. Facilitation, supra note 53, ch. 1 at 2.
57. The Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air, supra note 54, ch. 1 at 1.
58. See e.g., Onyeanusi v. Pan. Am. World Airways, Inc., 952 F.2d 788, 791
(3d. Cir. 1992); Simo Noboa v. Iberia Lineas Aereas de Espana, 383 F. Supp. 2d
323, 325–26 (D. Puerto Rico 2005).
59. See, e.g., Doe v. Etihad Airways P.J.S.C., 870 F.3d 406, 411 (6th Cir. 2017)
(noting that “[n]either our court nor the Supreme Court has yet interpreted any
provision of the Montreal Convention”).
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Court has addressed injuries to live persons.  The principal case re-
garding negligent recovery from a foreign airline or international
flight is Air France v. Saks,60 where the Court determined that Arti-
cle 17 of the Warsaw Convention61 (predecessor to Montreal Con-
vention) established the liability of international air carriers for
harm or injury caused to passengers.  In that case, the plaintiff
boarded an Air France flight from Paris to Los Angeles.  As the
aircraft descended into Los Angeles, the plaintiff felt severe pres-
sure and pain in her left ear.  Five days later, plaintiff consulted a
doctor who concluded she had become permanently deaf in her left
ear.  The plaintiff then filed suit against Air France, alleging “her
hearing loss was caused by negligent maintenance and operation of
the jetliner’s pressurization system.”62  The case was removed from
state court to the U.S. District Court for the Central District of Cal-
ifornia.  Air France moved for summary judgment on the ground
that plaintiff could not prove her injury was caused by an “acci-
dent” within the meaning of the Warsaw Convention.  After subse-
quent appeals, the Supreme Court heard the case and defined
accident as “any unintended and unexpected occurrence which pro-
duces hurt or loss.”63  The Court held that “liability under Article
17 of the Warsaw Convention arises only if a passenger’s injury is
caused by an unexpected or unusual event or happening that is ex-
ternal to the passenger.”64
Saks was followed by Eastern Airlines v. Floyd,65 where the Su-
preme Court held that Article 17 does not allow recovery for purely
mental distress.  There, an Eastern Airlines flight from Miami to
the Bahamas lost power in all three of its engines.  The plane, which
had turned around and was headed back to Miami, began losing
altitude rapidly.  Crew members informed the passengers that the
plane would be ditched in the Atlantic Ocean.  “[A]fter a period of
descending flight without power, the crew managed to restart an
60. Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985).
61. Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention provides that the carrier shall be
liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or wounding of a passenger
or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the
damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the
operations of embarking or disembarking. See Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, art. 17, Oct. 29,
1934, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Warsaw Convention].
62. Saks, 470 U.S. at 394.
63. Id. at 398.
64. Id. at 405.
65. Eastern Airlines v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530 (1991).
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engine and land the plane safely back at Miami International
Airport.”66
A group of passengers on the flight filed complaints against
Eastern Airlines, Inc., each claiming damages solely for mental dis-
tress arising out of the incident.  The district court concluded that
mental anguish alone was not compensable under Article 17.67  The
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the text of
Article 17 encompasses purely emotional distress.68  In a unani-
mous opinion delivered by Justice Marshall, the Supreme Court re-
versed the Court of Appeals, concluding that an air carrier cannot
be held liable under Article 17 when an accident has not caused a
passenger to suffer death, physical injury, or physical manifestation
of injury.69  The Court left open the question of whether passengers
could recover for mental injuries accompanied by physical
injuries.70
In Jack v. Trans World Airlines,71 the district court discussed
four recovery approaches for emotional distress claims that were
embraced by lower courts after the Floyd decision.  The first ap-
proach does not allow recovery for any emotional distress.  The sec-
ond allows recovery for all distress, as long as a bodily injury occurs.
The third allows recovery for emotional distress as damages for
bodily injury, including distress about the accident.  And the fourth
allows recovery only for emotional distress flowing from the bodily
injury.72  In Jack, the district court endorsed the fourth—now main-
stream—approach.73
In 2004, the Supreme Court decided Olympic Airways v.
Husain.74  There, plaintiff and her husband (who had a history of
recurrent anaphylactic reactions) were traveling from Athens to
San Francisco.  The couple requested to be moved to a non-smok-
ing section, because the husband was allergic to secondhand smoke.
The flight attendant refused.  As a result of the exposure, plaintiff’s
husband died.  The issue under review was:




70. See id. at 552.
71. Jack v. Trans World Airlines, 854 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
72. Id. at 665.
73. Id. at 668. See also, e.g., Ehrlich v. Am. Airlines Inc., 360 F.3d 366, 376
(2d Cir. 2004) (collecting cases and noting that “[t]he ‘mainstream view’ adhered
to by courts that have addressed the scope of Article 17 and considered the issue
before us ‘is that recovery for mental injuries is permitted only to the extent the
[emotional] distress is caused by the physical injuries sustained”).
74. Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644 (2004).
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whether the “accident” condition precedent to air carrier liability
under Article 17 is satisfied when the carrier’s unusual and unex-
pected refusal to assist a passenger is a link in a chain of causa-
tion resulting in a passenger’s pre-existing medical condition
being aggravated by exposure to a normal condition in the air-
craft cabin.75
In an opinion delivered by Justice Thomas, the Court held the
refusal of the flight attendant to assist plaintiff’s spouse after re-
peated requests constituted “an unexpected or unusual event or
happening” under Air France v. Saks.76
The four cases—Saks, Floyd, Jack, and Husain—stand for the
following principles.  First, in order for an injured plaintiff to re-
cover from a carrier under the Convention, there must be an “acci-
dent,” that is, an unusual or unexpected event or happening
external to the passenger.  Second, there must be bodily injury in
order for plaintiff to recover.  Third, the Supreme Court left open
the question of whether passengers can recover for mental injuries
that are accompanied by physical injuries.77
These cases were decided under the Warsaw Convention.  On
July 31, 2003, the U.S. Senate ratified the Montreal Convention.78
Although the Montreal Convention was meant to modernize and
ultimately replace the Warsaw Convention, it still closely follows
the language of the Warsaw Convention.79  For example, in both
75. Id. at 646.
76. Id. at 657.
77. Three U.S. courts of appeals in Terrafranca, In re Air Crash at Little Rock
Ark., and Carey have held that physical manifestations of emotional harm are not
recoverable under Article 17.  See Terrafranca v. Virgin Atl. Airways, 151 F.3d 108,
111 (3d Cir. 1998) (“[B]odily injury [is] the prerequisite to recovery; mere physical
manifestations of emotional injury are not sufficient.”); In re Air Crash at Little
Rock Ark., 291 F.3d 503, 512 (8th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 974 (2002)
(“[E]motional damages are recoverable . . . to the extent that they are caused by
physical injuries suffered in the accident. On the other hand, physical manifesta-
tion of mental injuries such as weight loss, sleeplessness, or physical changes in the
brain resulting from chronic PTSD are not compensable . . .”). See also Carey v.
United Airlines, 255 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2001).  The Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals indicated:
However, unlike the plaintiffs in Floyd, Carey claims that he also suffered
physical manifestations of his emotional and mental distress, including
nausea, cramps, perspiration, nervousness, tension, and sleeplessness.
Carey is correct that Floyd left open the question of whether such physi-
cal manifestations satisfy the “bodily injury” requirement in Article 17.
However, we are persuaded, in accordance with the Third Circuit’s deci-
sion in Terrafranca v. Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd., that they do not.
Id. at 1051–52.
78. 149 CONG. REC. S10870 (daily ed. July 31, 2003).
79. See, e.g., Bridgeman United Cont’l Holdings, 552 F. App’x. 294, 297 n.1
(5th Cir. 2013) (“Courts have frequently relied on cases interpreting the Warsaw
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Conventions, liability is found under Article 17.  Additionally,
under the Warsaw Convention, Article 22(1) limits the amount that
can be recovered under Article 17 in the event of a death or bodily
injury.  Similarly under the Montreal Convention, Article 21(1)
provides that the carrier shall not be liable for damages arising
under paragraph 1 of Article 17 to the extent that they exceed
100,000 Special Drawing Rights for each passenger if the carrier
proves:  (a) such damage was not due to the negligence or other
wrongful act or omission of the carrier or its servants or agents or
(b) such damage was solely due to the negligence or other wrongful
act or omission of a third party.
More pertinent, none of the Supreme Court cases discussed
above involve human remains.  A number of federal courts of ap-
peals, addressing negligence complaints emanating from the mis-
handling of human remains during international flights, have
grappled with how to address emotional distress claims.  For exam-
ple, in Onyeanusi v. Pan Am. Airways,80 a suit for the mishandling
of human remains transported from New York to Nigeria, a Niger-
ian of the Ibo tribe died in Philadelphia while visiting her son.  The
son made arrangements through a funeral home to have the airline
fly his mother’s body from New York to Nigeria.  The following
occurred:
The body was scheduled to leave New York on October 15 and
arrive in Nigeria on the morning of October 17 . . . The body,
however, did not arrive until October 25 . . .  When [the] remains
finally arrived . . . they were damaged and decomposed.  The air[
]tray that held the body was broken, allowing the body to be ex-
posed to weather.  Authorities at the Paris airport had allowed a
French funeral home to repair the casket and rewrap the body.
Consequently, when the remains arrived in Nigeria, the body was
wrapped in burlap, which according to the Ibo tribe’s culture sig-
nifies that the decedent committed suicide.  The body was also
face down in the casket, which according to the tribe’s culture
signifies that the circumstances of the death were dishonorable.
In fact, [the decedent] had died of pneumonia.81
Convention to interpret corresponding provisions of the Montreal Convention.”);
Ugaz v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1360 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (“Because
the Montreal Convention only recently came into force, it is appropriate to rely on
cases interpreting the Warsaw convention where the equivalent provision of the
Montreal Convention is substantively the same.”); Doe v. Etihad Airways,
P.J.S.C., 870 F.3d 406, 411 (6th Cir. 2017) (“[I]nterpretations of the Warsaw Con-
vention have at least some persuasive value in interpreting parallel provisions of
the Montreal Convention.”).
80. Onyeanusi v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 952 F.2d 788 (3d Cir. 1992).
81. Id. at 789–90.
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There, the court first had to determine whether the case was
governed by the Warsaw Convention as applied to “international
transportation of persons, baggage, or goods performed by [an] air-
craft for hire.”82  Plaintiff contended the Warsaw Convention did
not apply to his case, because his mother’s remains did not fall
under any of the three categories of “persons, baggage, or goods”
set forth therein.83  The court disagreed.  Citing Johnson v. Am.
Airlines,84 the court noted that human remains must be treated as
goods for the purposes of the Warsaw Convention,85 observing that
“to exclude human remains from the definition of ‘goods’ would
exempt a significant number of claims from the Convention, thus
exposing air carriers to inestimable liability.”86  As further justifica-
tion for why human remains should be treated as goods, the court
wrote:
Human remains can have significant commercial value, although
they are not typically bought and sold like other goods. Medical
schools and hospitals commonly use human cadavers for training
and experiments.  Human tissue and organs which are taken
from the recently deceased have inestimable value in transplant
operations.  Although remains which are used for these medical
and scientific purposes are usually donated, rather than bought
and sold, this does not negate their potential commercial value.
Onyeanusi argues that many states prohibit commerce in human
remains or organs.  Notwithstanding the legality of selling some
parts of the human body, most notably blood and sperm, we be-
lieve these state laws against organ and tissue sales are premised
on moral and ethical, rather than economic, considerations.  In
fact, the very existence of these state laws indicates that there
would be a market for human remains in the absence of govern-
ment intervention.87
But the argument that human remains can have significant
commercial value, and should therefore be treated as goods for pur-
poses of the Convention, is unavailing.  First, as argued by plaintiff,
human remains belong to no one, cannot be bought or sold, and
have a type of value not easily comprehended by the Warsaw Con-
vention’s damage provisions.88  As Justice Lumpkin of the Georgia
Supreme Court observed more than one hundred years ago:
82. Id. at 790.
83. Id.
84. Johnson v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 834 F.2d 721, 723 (9th Cir. 1987).
85. Onyeanusi, 952 F.2d at 791.
86. Id. at 793.
87. Id. at 792.
88. Id. at 791.
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Death is unique.  It is unlike aught else in its certainty and its
incidents.  A corpse in some respects is the strangest thing on
earth.  A man who but yesterday breathed and thought and
walked among us has passed away.  Something has gone.  The
body is left still and cold, and is all that is visible to mortal eye of
the man we knew.  Around it cling love and memory. Beyond it
may reach hope.  It must be laid away.  And the law[—]that rule
of action which touches all human things[—]must touch also this
thing of death.  It is not surprising that the law relating to this
mystery of what death leaves behind cannot be precisely brought
within the letter of all the rules regarding corn, lumber and pig
iron.89
Second, the opinion is devoid of any evidence that excluding
human remains from the definition of goods would expose carriers
to inestimable liability.  For example, no evidence exists to show
that prior to the Warsaw Convention, airlines were inundated with
lawsuits regarding human remains.  Further, no cases regarding
human remains have been litigated under the Montreal Conven-
tion.90  Third, the inestimable liability assertion assumes that there
will be a significant number of cases where airlines will mishandle
human remains.  In fact, the opposite is likely to happen if airlines
know courts would not treat human remains as goods, rather apply-
ing ordinary negligence principles.91  The Onyeanusi court seems to
think treating human remains as non-goods would run counter to
the Warsaw Convention’s goal of protecting airlines.  Assuming, ar-
guendo, that the primary goal of the Warsaw Convention was to
protect airlines,92 it seems the Montreal Convention swings the pen-
89. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Wilson, 51 S.E. 24, 24 (Ga. 1905).
90. Most of the cases labeling human remains as goods were decided under
the Warsaw Convention. See, e.g., Johnson v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 834 F.2d 721, 725
n.3 (9th Cir. 1987) (“We do not stand alone in classifying human remains as
‘goods.’ A number of cases arising from domestic flights have reached the same
result.”) (citing Blair v. Delta Air Lines Inc., 344 F. Supp. 360, 365 (S.D. Fla. 1972),
aff’d, 477 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam); Milhizer v. Riddle Airlines, Inc.,
185 F. Supp. 110, 113 (E.D. Mich. 1960), aff’d, 289 F.2d 933 (6th Cir. 1961)).
91. For example, in the Montreal Convention, an exoneration provision al-
lows a reduction in compensation for injuries caused by or contributed to by the
plaintiff, in the same manner as a pure-comparative-negligence or pure-compara-
tive-fault scheme; this exoneration provision applies to all claimed damages includ-
ing those falling under the strict-liability limit.  Montreal Convention art. 20; see
also Doe v. Etihad Airways P.J.S.C., 870 F.3d 406, 423 (6th Cir. 2017), cert. denied,
138 S. Ct. 1548 (2018).  One can argue here that negligence principles already ap-
ply in the Convention anyway.
92. See Doe, 870 F.3d at 420 (noting that “the original parties to the Warsaw
Convention had the “primary purpose of . . . limiting the liability of air carriers in
order to foster the growth of the fledgling commercial aviation industry”); Eastern
Airlines, Inc., v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 546 (1991) (“Whatever may be the current
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dulum in the opposite direction.  For example, in Doe v. Etihad Air-
ways P.J.S.C.,93 the court noted that “the Montreal Convention
replaced a ‘restrictive,’ ‘pro-airline industry’ regime, with a treaty
that favors passengers rather than airlines.”  But even despite this
“pro-passenger” shift, the Convention still heavily favors airlines in
terms of recovery for emotional distress.
In Ehrlich v. Am. Airlines Inc.,94 the Ehrliches were traveling
from Maryland to New York for a connecting flight to London.
“On approaching John F. Kennedy International Airport in New
York, their aircraft overshot the runway and was abruptly stopped
by an arrestor bed[,]”95 preventing the plane from otherwise plung-
ing into the waters of nearby Thurston Bay.  The Ehrliches suffered
physical and mental injuries during this incident.  They sued Ameri-
can Airlines to recover damages for those injuries under the War-
saw Convention.  The court framed the issue as “whether
passengers can hold carriers liable in accordance with the Warsaw
Convention for mental injuries that accompany, but are not caused
by, bodily injuries.”96  The court held that damages for mental
anguish alone cannot be recovered under Article 17 of the Warsaw
Convention.  The court stated that “[b]y construing Article 17 in a
fashion that avoids anomalous and illogical results, our interpreta-
tion also comports with the Supreme Court’s decision in Floyd.
The Floyd Court held that an air carrier could not be held liable for
purely mental injuries.”97
This case was based on the Warsaw Convention (the events oc-
curred before the U.S. Senate ratified the Montreal Convention).
Still, the court extensively discussed the Montreal Convention, in-
cluding Montreal Conference statements made by the American
delegate regarding recovery for mental injuries.98  The American
delegate indicated plaintiffs could recover for mental injury when-
ever they sustained a physical injury, regardless if that mental injury
resulted from that physical injury.  Ultimately, the court concluded
the American delegate’s statements did not constitute an appropri-
ate interpretation of the Warsaw Convention; therefore, the court
view among Convention signatories, in 1929 the parties were more concerned with
protecting air carriers and fostering a new industry rather than providing a full
recovery to injured passengers.”).
93. Doe v. Etihad Airways P.J.S.C., 870 F.3d 406 (6th Cir. 2017).
94. Ehrlich v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 360 F.3d 366 (2d Cir. 2004).
95. Id. at 368.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 386 (quoting Floyd, 499 U.S. at 552).
98. See id. at 398.
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determined a carrier may be held liable under Article 17 for mental
injuries only if they are caused by bodily injuries.99
Bassam v. Am. Airlines100 is another case in which the court
denied recovery for emotional distress under Montreal Conven-
tion.101  Bassam, a citizen of Lebanon, flew from Lebanon to Baton
Rouge, Louisiana, with stops in France and Dallas, Texas.  When
she left Lebanon, Bassam checked two pieces of baggage.  When
she arrived in Dallas, she received her baggage before entering
through U.S. Customs; at that time, her baggage was in good condi-
tion and contained all of its original contents.  After inspection, cus-
toms officials returned her baggage.  She then handed both over to
a person in uniform at the baggage loading conveyor belt.  Bassam
arrived in Baton Rouge as scheduled, but one piece of her baggage
did not.  Nearly four months later, American Airlines notified Bas-
sam that her baggage had been found and delivered it to the apart-
ment complex where she was staying in Baton Rouge.  She claimed
that upon receipt, her most valuable items were missing.102
In August 2006, Bassam filed suit in Louisiana state court for
lost baggage, seeking $5,434.00 in damages.  After American Air-
lines removed the case to federal court, Bassam filed an amended
complaint and added a claim for the “embarrassment and upset of
not being able to dress and appear in public as was her prior prac-
tice.”103  The court first addressed her lost baggage claim under Ar-
ticles 17(2), 22(2), and 22(5) of the Montreal Convention.  Bassam
argued “[t]he four (4) month delay in recovery of the luggage, al-
lowing [her] personal belongings to be ransacked and stolen, com-
pounded with [American Airlines’] refusal to take any meaningful
steps to help [her] in an obvious time of need” equated to willful
misconduct.  The court noted this argument lacked merit, because
she failed to set forth any competent summary judgment evidence
that American Airlines’ actions (losing her baggage) constituted
willful misconduct.104  The court next dismissed her emotional dis-
tress claims,105 noting that “[a]s directed by the Montreal Conven-
tion, in looking to existing judicial precedent, courts have held that
emotional injuries are not recoverable under Article 17 of the Mon-
99. Id. at 400.
100. Bassam v. Am. Airlines, 287 F. App’x. 309 (5th Cir. 2008).
101. Id. at 318.
102. Id. at 311.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 313.
105. The Court first noted that she had waived the emotional distress claim
for failure to brief in violation of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28 but still
went ahead and addressed the argument. Id. at 316.
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treal Convention106 or Warsaw Convention unless they were caused
by physical injuries.”107  Therefore, Bassam could not recover emo-
tional distress damages under the Convention.
The Bassam court followed the general trend among federal
courts:  plaintiffs cannot recover under either the Warsaw or the
Montreal Convention for mental anguish unaccompanied by physi-
cal injury.  By extension, family members bringing claims for negli-
gent mishandling of human remains by international airlines will
have no adequate remedy in federal court unless they can prove
physical injury.  This is a herculean task.  But one federal court of
appeals seems to have bucked this trend.  In Doe v. Etihad Airways,
P.J.S.C., Jane Doe was pricked by a hypodermic needle that was
hidden in the pocket of a backseat storage compartment.  The next
day, Doe saw a family physician who noted a small needle poke on
her finger.  She was prescribed medication for possible exposure to
hepatitis, tetanus, and HIV, and she underwent several rounds of
testing over the following year.  All tests came back negative.108
Doe filed claims for “damages from Etihad for both her physi-
cal injury and her ‘mental distress, shock, mortification, sickness
and illness, outrage[,] and embarrassment from natural sequela of
possible exposure to’ various diseases. Her husband [claimed] loss
of consortium.”109  At the trial level, Etihad moved for, and the dis-
trict court granted, partial summary judgment in favor of Etihad (as
to Doe’s claims for mental anguish).110  Etihad argued that “‘dam-
age sustained in case of bodily injury’ means only ‘damage caused
by bodily injury,’ and thus does not include Doe’s fear of contagion
and other emotional-distress and mental-anguish damages—dam-
ages that Etihad claims were caused not by Doe’s bodily injury (the
small hole in her finger) but by the nature of the instrumentality of
that injury (the needle).”111
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the district court
erred in holding that Doe’s mental-anguish damages were not re-
coverable under Article 17(1) of the Montreal Convention.112  The
106. Article 17 (1) of the Montreal Convention provides that “[t]he carrier is
liable for damage sustained in case of death or bodily injury of a passenger upon
condition only that the accident which caused the death or injury took place on
board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or dis-
embarking.”  Montreal Convention art. 17(1).
107. Bassam, 287 F. App’x. at 317.
108. Id. at 409–10.
109. Id. at 409.
110. Id. at 410.
111. Id. at 409.
112. See also Montreal Convention art. 17(1); Bassam, 287 F. App’x. at 316.
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court ruled that because an accident onboard Etihad’s aircraft
caused Doe to suffer a bodily injury (a fact that Etihad conceded),
Doe may recover damages for her mental anguish regardless of
whether that anguish was caused directly by her bodily injury or
more generally by the accident that caused the injury.  Specifically,
the court stated:
To prevail on a claim for damages under Article 17(1), a plaintiff
must prove that (1) there was an “accident,” defined as “an unex-
pected or unusual event or happening that is external to the pas-
senger,” (2) the accident happened either “on board the aircraft”
or “during the operations of embarking or disembarking”; and
(3) the accident caused “death or bodily injury of a passenger.”
The carrier is then liable for damage sustained, which we inter-
pret to include emotional or mental damages, so long as they are
traceable to the accident, regardless of whether they are caused
directly by the bodily injury.113
Applying the above rule to the facts, the court found the acci-
dent was the needle pricking Doe’s finger.  The accident happened
on board Etihad’s aircraft, and the accident caused bodily injury (as
Etihad conceded).  Etihad was, therefore, liable for damages sus-
tained by Doe, including both her physical injury and the mental
anguish she was able to prove that she sustained.  In addition, if
Doe were able to prove fear of contagion or other mental anguish,
Etihad would be liable for damages arising from that anguish re-
gardless of whether the anguish was directly caused by the physical
hole in Doe’s finger or by the fact that Doe was pricked by a
needle.114
This case is significant for plaintiffs in three ways.  First, al-
though the case is not about human remains, it deals with emotional
distress caused by an airline’s negligence, and opens the door for
plaintiffs to recover for mental anguish unrelated to injury.  Indeed,
the court indicated:
[T]he text of Article 17(1) is still not entirely clear as to what
connection must exist between the required bodily injury and the
claimed mental anguish. The plain text of Article 17(1) is sufficient
on its own part to reject Etihad’s interpretation of it. And the plain
text of Article 17(1) allows our conclusion that when a single “acci-
dent” causes both bodily injury and mental anguish, that mental
anguish is sustained “in case of” the bodily injury. But the plain text
on its own does not necessarily require that a single accident cause
113. Doe, 870 F.3d at 433 (citations omitted).
114. Id. at 434.
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both the required bodily injury and the claimed mental anguish in
order for that mental anguish to be ‘sustained in case of’ the bodily
injury, as our conclusion suggests.115
Second, the decision creates a split from previous interpreta-
tion of the same provision in Ehrlich v. Am. Airlines Inc., a case
from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.  Thus, a circuit split
maybe developing.116  The Supreme Court may be called on one
day to bring uniformity to this area of the law.
Third, the decision stressed that the overarching purpose of the
Montreal Convention was to favor passengers.  The court notes that
“the Montreal Convention replaced a ‘restrictive,’ ‘pro-airline in-
dustry’ regime, with ‘a treaty that favors passengers rather than air-
lines.’ And it did so on terms that reflected decades of effort by the
United States to abolish the outdated limitations of the Warsaw
Convention.”117  This is ground breaking in the sense that it is the
first time a federal court has declined to rely on the Warsaw Con-
vention to interpret the Montreal Convention.118
Because the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in Doe v.
Etihad Airways, one can hypothesize that allowing recovery for
emotional distress in some instances may not necessarily violate the
letter and spirit of Floyd.119  If passengers can potentially recover
for mental injuries unrelated to physical injuries, then negligence
claims for the mishandling of human remains would fare much bet-
ter.  In fact, federal common law will be in consonance with domes-
tic state laws which have long granted remedies for emotional
distress resulting from negligent interference with human remains.
V. STATE LAWS ON THE MISHANDLING OF HUMAN REMAINS
Various states recognize emotional distress claims resulting
from the mishandling of human remains without physical manifes-
115. Id. at 418.
116. Ehrlich v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 360 F.3d 366, 400 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting
that “mental injuries are recoverable under Article 17 only to the extent that they
have been caused by bodily injuries”).
117. Doe, 870 F.3d at 423.
118. The Sixth Circuit noted:
In light of the great difference between the purpose of the Warsaw Con-
vention and the purpose of the Montreal Convention, then, it hardly
seems appropriate for us to look to the purpose of the Warsaw Conven-
tion, as Etihad would have us do in relying on Ehrlich, in order to arrive
at a different conclusion from one compelled by the plain text of the
Montreal Convention.
Id.
119. Eastern Airlines v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 552–53 (1991).
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tation of injury.120  For example, in Whitehair v. Highland Memory
Gardens,121 the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held
that “[a] cause of action for negligent or intentional mishandling of
a dead body does not require a showing of physical injury or pecu-
niary loss.  Mental anguish is a sufficient basis for recovery of dam-
ages.”122  The defendant, Highland Memory Gardens, entered into
a contract with the West Virginia Department of Highways to relo-
cate bodies buried in the Old Baptist Cemetery in Buckhannon,
West Virginia.  The plaintiff alleged that the removal was done in
an incredibly careless manner; the defendant lost or misplaced the
remains of her sister and two aunts after removal and failed to re-
move all of her cousin’s remains.123  The trial court granted the de-
fendant’s motion to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiff failed to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted.  In reversing the
trial court, the West Virginia Court of Appeals noted:
[C]ases involving loss of bodies prior to burial support the pro-
position that a cause of action exists for negligently or intention-
ally mishandling or losing a dead body, even when its
disinterment and reinterment are authorized. This is compatible
with law from other jurisdictions as well as our holding that an
unlawful disinterment can give rise to damages.124
Similarly, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals indicated “the
award for emotional distress is justified in cases involving the mis-
handling of a dead body, and the jury is authorized to look to the
circumstances conducive to such suffering.”125  In that case, the de-
cedent’s children sued the defendant for burying their father when
they wanted his remains cremated.  The children alleged emotional
distress caused by the defendant’s refusal to honor their disposi-
tional wishes.126  The defendant argued that the children had no
out-of-pocket expenses and that they could not have suffered
mental distress because they had not seen their father for approxi-
mately 16 years.127  The appellate court rejected the funeral home’s
contentions, noting:
120. See SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 11, at 476 (compiling cases for negli-
gent interference with dead bodies).
121. Whitehair v. Highland Memory Gardens, 327 S.E.2d 438 (W. Va. 1985).
122. Id. at 462–63.
123. Id. at 459.
124. Id. at 462–63.
125. SCI Ala. Funeral Servs., Inc. v. Brown, 770 So. 2d 97, 101 (Ala. Civ. App.
1999).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 102.
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The children testified extensively as to the mental distress that
they suffered as a proximate cause of [the defendant’s] breach of
duty to act in accordance with their wishes.  The fact that the
children had no contact with their father is of no significance in
this instance, particularly in view of the fact that the children tes-
tified that they were abandoned by their father.128
Illinois common law recognizes the tort of negligent or inten-
tional mishandling of human remains.  In Cochran v. Securitas Sec.
Servs. USA, Inc.,129 the Appellate Court of Illinois held that “a
cause of action exists for negligent interference with the right to
possession of a decedent’s body by the next of kin, without circum-
stances of aggravation, [i.e.], allegations establishing willful and
wanton conduct by the defendant.”130  The decedent died in his
home in Moultrie County, Illinois.  His body was transported to the
Moultrie County morgue and then to Memorial Medical Center in
Springfield, Illinois for an autopsy.  A couple days later, representa-
tives of a funeral home arrived at the medical center’s morgue to
obtain the remains of an individual named William Carroll.  How-
ever, the medical center mistakenly provided the funeral home with
the decedent’s (not Carroll’s) remains.  The decedent’s body was
then cremated by the funeral home.  His mother sued the medical
center, the funeral home, and the defendant, alleging, among other
claims, interference with the right to possess the decedent’s body.131
The trial court dismissed the case on the grounds that there is no set
of facts by which the could demonstrate a duty owed by the defen-
dant to her.132  On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court reversed,
finding that plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts in her amended
complaint to state a cause of action against defendant for interfer-
ence with her right to possess her deceased son’s remains.133  In
particular, the court noted that while courts are traditionally “reluc-
tant to allow negligence actions where only emotional damages are
claimed, the more modern view supports the position taken by
plaintiff in the instant case and recognizes an ordinary negligence
cause of action arising out of the next of kin’s right to possession of
a decedent’s remains.”134  To bolster its holding, the Illinois court
cited many other states that permit recovery in cases involving the
128. Id.
129. Cochran v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc., 59 N.E.3d 234 (Ill. App. Ct.
2016).
130. Id. at 249.
131. Id. at 237.
132. Id. at 239–40.
133. Id. at 250.
134. Id. at 249.
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alleged negligent mishandling of a decedent’s remains without cir-
cumstances of aggravation.135
To be fair, some states do not permit recovery for emotional
distress arising from the negligent mishandling of human remains
absent physical injury.  These states tend to reject the position of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 868.136  For example the
Kansas Court of Appeals in Ely v. Hitchcock137 noted that the Kan-
sas Supreme Court declined to adopt the position of Section 868.138
The same applies in the District of Columbia.  In Wash. v. John T.
Rhines Co.,139 the D.C. District Court of Appeals held the jurisdic-
tion did not recognize the tort of negligent infliction of emotional
distress arising from the alleged mishandling of human remains.140
Florida has a narrower exception.  The State first recognized the
tort of tortious interference with human remains in Kirksey v. Jen-
nigan.141  In that case, a five-year-old child was accidentally shot
and killed at her home.  The defendant, an undertaker, took the
body of the child to his establishment without the mother’s author-
ity.  When the mother demanded the return of her child’s body, the
defendant refused.  The defendant also embalmed the body and re-
fused to deliver it to the mother or anyone else until a $50 fee was
paid.142  The mother sued for the wrongful withholding of the body,
the unauthorized embalming, and the holding of the body as secur-
ity for the payment of the $50 fee.  Because plaintiff did not allege
physical injury, the trial court dismissed her claims.  The Florida
Supreme Court stated odq;there can be no recovery for mental pain
and anguish unconnected with physical injury in an action arising
out of the negligent breach of a contract whereby simple negligence
is involved.”143  However, the court allowed plaintiff to recover, be-
cause defendant’s actions constituted malice.  Florida law currently
makes a distinction between physical injury and physical impact for
135. Id. at 248–49 (citing cases from Arizona, California, Connecticut, Ha-
waii, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Montana, Nevada, New
Jersey, New York, Ohio, Tennessee, Texas and West Virginia).
136. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 868 (1977) (“One who intention-
ally, recklessly or negligently removes, withholds, mutilates or operates upon the
body of a dead person or prevents its proper interment or cremation is subject to
liability to a member of the family of the deceased who is entitled to the disposi-
tion of the body.”).
137. Ely v. Hitchcock, 58 P.3d 116 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002).
138. Id. at 122.
139. Wash. v. John T. Rhines Co., 646 A.2d 345 (D.C. 1994).
140. Id. at 346.
141. Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1950).
142. Id. at 189.
143. Id. at 190.
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claims based on mental distress for the negligent mishandling of
human remains.  Generally, “[t]he absence of physical impact does
not bar a claim for the negligent mishandling of a dead body under
Florida law.”144  Based on the above, one can deduce that a plaintiff
in Florida must prove either physical impact, physical injury, or ma-
licious conduct in order to recover for emotional distress relating to
mishandling of human remains.145
In sum, claims for mental anguish damages based on the mis-
handling of human remains are well established in a majority of
states.  Whether through the quasi property rights doctrine, negli-
gence, or a subspecies of the tort of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, state courts allow plaintiffs to recover for emotional
injuries without a showing of physical injury.146  This is a major in-
congruence between the Convention and U.S. domestic law.  An-
other area of conflict in the Convention is the overlap of tort and
contract principles regarding human remains.
VI. HUMAN REMAINS AS A MATTER OF TORT AND CONTRACT
LAW
The Montreal Convention was intended to establish uniformity
within international transportation by air.  To this end, the Conven-
tion places limits on liabilities for damages, including passenger in-
jury (Article 17) and on destruction, loss, damage, or delay of cargo
(Article 22).  But the Convention’s limits on liabilities lead to an
overlap and thus a conflict between tort and contract law.  First,
Article 22 limits carrier liability for destruction, loss, damage, or
delay of cargo to 17147 SDR per kilogram (approximately $10.43
per pound) unless the consignor declared the cargo had a higher
value.148  From this provision, it is clear the weight of the human
remains would be the sole basis for the monetary amount of liabil-
ity.  Consider the following possible recovery limits for destruction,
loss, damage, or delay to human remains:
144. Gonzalez v. Metro. Dade Cty. Pub. Health Tr., 651 So. 2d 673, 675 (Fla.
1995).
145. See id.
146. See Cochran v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc, 59 N.E.3d 234, 248–49 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2016).
147. Montreal Convention art. 22. The limit is currently 19 SDR. Press Re-
lease, IATA, News Brief: Cargo Liability Limits Standardized— Major Step For-
ward to Simplify Air Cargo (July 14, 2010) https://bit.ly/32fuund [https://perma.cc/
ZK2R-7CUX].
148. Montreal Convention art. 22.
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11 lb infant (4.9kgs) 93 SDR = $54
110 lb teenager (49.9 kgs) 948 SDR = $550
220 lb adult (99.8 kgs) 1895 SDR = $1,099
440 lb adult (199.6 kgs) 3792 SDR = $2,199
It is patently unfair to afford more damages to an overweight
decedent’s relatives than to a newborn decedent’s relatives.  It can
also be argued that because men tend to be heavier than women
and children, the liability limits based on weight alone ostensibly
favor men over women and children.  An argument can, therefore,
be made for age and gender discrimination within the Conven-
tion.149  One could also imagine an instance where the human re-
mains are cremated.  Obviously, ashes in an urn will never weigh as
much as a casket with a dead body.  In this way, the Convention
fails to account for damages equally, as weight and thus reward de-
pend upon intimate decisions regarding the final disposition of
human remains.  Contract law does not account for this.150
Second, Article 22 provisions relating to cargo limit carrier lia-
bility where value exceeds the consignor’s actual interest in delivery
at destination in which case liability is limited to such actual inter-
est.151  The concern here is that this provision, though perfectly log-
ical as a contract principle, is nevertheless lacking a few key words
related to human remains.  For example, mustn’t the disposition of
human remains always be timely?  One could imagine no worse ex-
perience than having a loved one’s remains delayed for a period of
days before reaching the final resting place, particularly in cultures
and religions that require a timely or speedy burial.152  Human re-
149. But see Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 271–72 (1979).
Most laws classify, and many affect certain groups unevenly, even though
the law itself treats them no differently from all other members of the
class described by the law.  When the basic classification is rationally
based, uneven effects upon particular groups within a class are ordinarily
of no constitutional concern.
Id.
150. To be sure, there are a few instances where the mishandling of dead bod-
ies may result in a breach of contract cause of action. See, e.g., Wilson v. Houston
Funeral Home, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 169, 173 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); Sarri v. Jongordon
Corp., 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 82, 88-89 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co., 426
P.2d 173, 179 (Cal. 1967).
151. Montreal Convention art. 22.
152. Regina Prosser et al., An Orthodox Perspective of the Jewish-end-of-life
Experience, 30 HOME HEALTHCARE NURSE 579, 584 (2012) (writing that in the
Jewish funeral rights, “burial is performed within 24 hours of a death and crema-
tion is a prohibited act”); Carol Komaromy, Cultural Diversity in Death and Dying,
11 NURSING MGMT. 32, 33 (Dec. 2004).
Ideally, a Muslim burial occurs within 24 hours of death . . . .  Religious
principles are often interpreted and applied with a degree of flexibility.
For instance, some Muslims in east London send bodies back to their
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mains are perishable; that they have already “perished” in the tradi-
tional sense makes no difference.  As the language stands, there is
no impetus to have the airlines act promptly to correct any delay.
Better language could perhaps read “actual interest in timely deliv-
ery at destination,” rather than just “delivery at destination.”
Article 22 further provides that the carrier is liable for the
higher value if the consignor has declared the cargo at a higher
value.  A cynical person might ask, how is it possible to declare a
higher value for human remains?  If we assume 300 pounds for the
total weight of the casket (200 pounds, 90.7 kilograms) and human
remains (100 pounds, 45.3 kilograms),153 the recoverable figure
comes to approximately 136 kg X 19 SDR = 2,584 SDR or $1,505.
If we assume the average weight of an adult at a conservative 70
kilograms (about 156 pounds), the figure would be slightly higher.
These figures reiterate how the Convention would operate to give
different monetary remedies if human remains are classified as
cargo, with those remedies being solely based on the weight of the
remains, state of the remains (whether cremated or uncremated),
and the personal decisions of the deceased and the family in the
final disposition of remains.  It is clear that remedy by weight sim-
ply does not allow for fair recovery in the case of a more or less
uniform harm (losing, damaging, or delaying human remains).
Furthermore, how to declare a higher value is not specifically
indicated in the Convention.  The airlines have attempted to fill this
void in their shipment contracts.  For example, American Airlines’
The Air Cargo Tariff (“TACT”) rules have several provisions re-
lated to restrictions on declared value of cargo and valuation
charges.  The airline will not accept any shipment that exceeds a
declared value of 500,000 USD (or local currency equivalent) unless
advance arrangements have been made.  Further, “[t]he maximum
limit of declared value on any American Airlines aircraft shall not
exceed 2,000,000 USD unless advance arrangements have been
made.”154
Here, we see that American Airlines has elected to use USD as
the indicator of value. As of October 1, 2016, 1 SDR is equivalent
ancestral homes for burial, even though this involves the embalming of
the body by non-Muslims and, inevitably, delays in burial well beyond 24
hours.
Id.
153. It is easy to reach this 300-pound mark because the average weight of a
casket is 200–400 pounds. 10+ Best Tips for Pallbearers, LOVE LIVES ON, https://
bit.ly/2Yx62eI [https://perma.cc/G6J3-8YX3] (last visited July 5, 2019).
154. Am. Airlines AA/001, Section 8.3 Information by Carrier 1, 99 (Apr.
2019), https://bit.ly/2FW8d3X [https://perma.cc/TC4C-9QQ6].
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\124-1\DIK102.txt unknown Seq: 32  6-NOV-19 12:06
84 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 124:53
to 0.58252 USD.155  If a loved one declared a value of 500,000 USD
(maximum that could be declared on an American Airlines flight
without prior arrangements), that value would be 291,260 SDR.
Assuming a total weight of 206 kilograms (136 kilograms or 300
pound casket; 70 kilograms or 156 pound human remains), the per
kilogram declared value would be roughly 1,413 SDR.  This clearly
subjects the consignor to valuation charges under American Air-
lines contract terms.  The valuation charges provision indicates “un-
less otherwise noted, consignments valued at more than 19 SDR[ ]
per kilograms [sic] will be assessed valuation charges of 0.50 per-
cent of the Shipper’s declared value for carriage exceeding 19
SDR[ ] per kilograms [sic].”156
Ultimately, under American Airlines contract terms, one can
declare whatever value, up to 2,000,000 USD, as long as one is will-
ing to pay for it.  Still, in the event of a mishap, it’s unclear whether
that declared value will be in excess of the actual interest in timely
delivery under Article 22 of the Convention.  A 500,000 USD de-
clared value is more than most life insurance policies.  As a compar-
ison, armed service members generally have life insurance policies
of $400,000 that pay out upon death.157  One would think that this
declaration of value and the extra money that is assessed in valua-
tion charges would provide an impetus for American Airlines to
make timely delivery with no mishap.
Delta Airlines’ International Notice Concerning Carriers Limi-
tation on Liability mirrors American Airlines’ valuation charge
standard (in excess of 19 SDR).  The contract language provides in
pertinent part:
If the carriage involves an ultimate destination or stop in a coun-
try other than the country of departure, the Warsaw Convention
or the Montreal Convention may be applicable and[,] in most
cases[,] limit the liability of the Carrier in respect of loss of, dam-
age, or delay to cargo.  Depending on the applicable regime, and
unless a higher value is declared, liability of the Carrier may be
limited to 19 Special Drawing Rights per kilogram.158
Just like American Airlines, Delta also permits a declaration of
higher value on cargo by noting that “for cargo accepted for car-
155. Special Drawing Right (SDR) Factsheet, supra note 22.
156. See Section 8.3 Information by Carrier, supra note 154.
157. DEF. FIN. & ACCOUNTING SERV., Service Members’ Group Life Insur-
ance (Feb. 11, 2014), https://bit.ly/32gloGC [https://perma.cc/A6BJ-722E].
158. DELTA AIRLINES, International Notice Concerning Carriers’ Limitation
of Liability, https://bit.ly/2G7K5eK [https://perma.cc/UK49-7N7A] (last visited July
10, 2019).
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riage, the Warsaw Convention and the Montreal Convention permit
[the] shipper to increase the limitation of liability by declaring a
higher value for carriage and paying a supplemental charge if
required.”159
United Airlines’ International Conditions of Contract also uses
19 SDR as a limitation of liability and directly cites the Montreal
Convention.  The limitation stands “unless a greater per kilogram
monetary limit is provided in any applicable Convention or in Car-
rier’s general conditions of carriage.”160  Yet again, we see the same
language as in other contracts:  “[f]or cargo accepted for carriage,
the Warsaw Convention and the Montreal Convention permit the
shipper to increase the limitation of liability by declaring a higher
value for carriage and paying a supplemental charge if required.”161
Both United Airlines and Delta seem to use the same notice con-
cerning carriers’ limitation of liability.
VII. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? SUGGESTED
APPROACHES
The Montreal Convention’s classification of human remains as
cargo, coupled with its liability limits in the case of destruction, loss,
damage, or delay in the carriage of cargo, produces palpably unfair
results for plaintiffs.  The question then arises, where do we go from
here?
The most effective recommendation would be for the Conven-
tion to allow recovery for emotional distress without physical in-
jury.  This is unlikely to happen for a number of reasons, two of
which merit mentioning here.  First, changing the Convention
would likely take a long time and would require ratification of the
changes by all signatories.  As a point of illustration, although the
Montreal Convention was signed in Montreal in 1999, the U.S.
Congress did not ratify the treaty until 2003.162  It is likely the pro-
cess of amending the Convention may take even longer, especially
if signatories do not agree on the amendments.  Second, airlines are
159. Id. § 6.1.
160. UNITED AIRLINES, INTERNATIONAL CONDITIONS OF CONTRACT NOTICE
CONCERNING CARRIERS LIMITATION OF LIABILITY § 4 (July 1, 2010), https://bit.ly/
30t4m6i [https://perma.cc/3M57-3FXG].
161. Id. § 6/6.1.
162. See Ehrlich v. Am. Airlines Inc., 360 F.3d 366, 372 (2d Cir. 2004) (analyz-
ing the applicability of the Montreal Convention prior to and after ratification in
2003).
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likely to push back against any amendments that are designed to
provide for pain and suffering unaccompanied by physical injury.163
Closely related to recovery for emotional distress is whether
corpses or cremated human remains should come under the pur-
view of “goods.”164  It might be worthwhile to have a discussion
about whether society should give human remains the dignity and
respect of personhood or should lump human remains within the
bundle of property rights.165  If only to avoid anomalous results in
the Convention, the former would be preferable, at least to those
whose dead relatives are being transported by the carriers.  There is
something viscerally revolting about classifying a decedent as a
good or cargo.
Next, a stronger and practical suggestion may be for the courts
to interpret the Convention in such a way as to avoid the absurdi-
ties and anomalous results of recovery based only on the weight of
the human remains and casket alone.  Courts have cautioned time
and again that “[w]henever possible, interpretations of a treaty that
produce anomalous or illogical results should be avoided.”166  Here,
as discussed in Part VII, it is absurd to recover more from the negli-
gent mishandling of an adult or overweight decedent versus an in-
fant decedent.  Surely, this is an absurdity that the courts can avoid.
Interpreting the Convention to avoid this absurd result is further
163. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Int’l Air Transport Ass’n in Support of
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 20–21, Etihad Airways P.J.S.C. v. Doe, 138 S.
Ct. 1548 (2018) (No. 17-977).  The brief states:
The goal of prompt claim resolution will not be achieved as commercial
air carriers will now be forced to litigate mental injury claims that are
unrelated to bodily injury, particularly where they are questionable.  Dis-
covery on the type and extent of the mental injury sustained—including
whether treatment was sought—will burden the courts and parties with
expensive expert discovery.  Concern over fraudulent physical and
mental injury allegations will likely hinder settlement discussions.
Id.
164. RUWANTISSA ABEYRATNE, CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CIVIL
AVIATION: A COMMENTARY 216 (2014) (“Do corpses or cremated human remains
come under the purview of goods? It might be worthwhile for a detailed discussion
of the status of human remains in the global aviation context and a revisit of the
1957 ICAO guidelines.”).
165. See, e.g., Walter Kuzenski, Property in Dead Bodies, 9 MARQ. L. REV. 17
(1924).  The author notes:
There are few questions in the entire field of law that are so prolific a
source of interest as whether or not there exists a property right in a dead
body.  It is certain under the modern conception of the law applicable
that there can be no commercial property in a dead body.  The wide di-
vergence of opinion lies in whether there is that right to possession which
apparently is an incident of an absolute or qualified property interest.
Id. at 17.
166. Ehrlich v. Am. Airlines Inc., 360 F.3d 366, 387 (2d Cir. 2004).
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strengthened by the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court has neither
been presented with nor addressed the issue of whether human re-
mains should be treated as cargo under the Convention.  In Floyd,
the Court expressed no view as to whether passengers can recover
for mental injuries that are accompanied by physical injuries.167
This means there is room for the recovery for pain and suffering
resulting from the mishandling of human remains.
Alternatively, to overcome the Montreal Convention’s liability
limits, plaintiffs can try to argue the willful misconduct exception.
Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention provides:
The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions
of this Convention which exclude or limit his liability, if the dam-
age is caused by his willful misconduct or by such default on his
part as, in accordance with the law of the Court seised [sic] of the
case, is considered to be equivalent to willful misconduct.168
The question has always been whether the willful misconduct
exception was abrogated by the Montreal Convention.169  It is true
that unlike the Warsaw Convention, the Montreal Convention does
not have any exception to the limit of liability for willful misconduct
per se.  Rather, Article 22(5) has language akin to willful miscon-
duct. It states:
167. See Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 552–53 (1991).  The
court indicated:
We conclude that an air carrier cannot be held liable under Article 17
when an accident has not caused a passenger to suffer death, physical
injury, or physical manifestation of injury.  Although Article 17 renders
air carriers liable for “damage sustained in the event of” . . . such injuries,
we express no view as to whether passengers can recover for mental inju-
ries that are accompanied by physical injuries.  That issue is not presented
here because respondents do not allege physical injury or physical mani-
festation of injury.
Id.  (citations omitted).
168. Warsaw Convention art. 25.
169. See, e.g., Bassam v. Am. Airlines, 287 F. App’x. 309, 312–13 (5th Cir.
2008).  The court noted:
Only four articles of the Montreal Convention are relevant here.  Article
17 defines conditions for carrier liability for harm to passengers, including
death or bodily injury and for loss or damage to checked baggage.  Arti-
cle 19 similarly defines conditions for carrier liability for damage caused
by delay in the carriage by air of passengers, baggage, or cargo.  Articles
21 and 22 set forth a strict liability regime for fault of the carrier as to
these damages but place a limitation of liability for each type of claim.
Article 22(5), however, provides a willful misconduct exception to this
limitation.
Id. at 313 (emphasis added).
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The foregoing provisions of paragraph 1 and 2 of this Article
shall not apply if it is proved that the damage resulted from an
act or omission of the carrier, its servants or agents, done with
intent to cause damage or recklessly and with knowledge that dam-
age would probably result; provided that in the case of such act or
omission of a servant or agent, it is also proved that such servants
or agents was acting within the scope of its employment.170
This indicates that Article 22(3) liability in the case of carriage
of cargo is excluded from the Article 22(5) exceptions, because it
only refers to the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 (i.e., Articles
22(1) and 22(2)).  But whether the exclusion of Article 22(3) from
the exceptions provided for in Article 22(5) means that the limit on
liability is unbreakable is an issue federal courts have not de-
cided.171  The bottom line is, under Article 22(3), the use of willful
misconduct argument is a Hail Mary.  Even under Article 22(5), the
plaintiff bears a heavy burden of showing willful misconduct.172
Succinctly put, under this exception, the plaintiff can only win on a
wing and a prayer.
Assuming, arguendo, that the Convention’s liability limits can-
not be changed easily, the airlines themselves can make changes to
the policies and procedures for handling human remains.  For ex-
ample, airlines can require that human remains be stored in secure
areas during layovers or stopovers.  This common sense practice
would add an element of ordinary care to such sensitive transport.
As a point of comparison, the carriers can learn from the U.S.
Army, even though the Convention does not apply to military air-
crafts or transport.173  The Army transports human remains using
commercial aircrafts and has specific procedures and policies for
170. Montreal Convention art. 22(5).
171. But see the Appellate Court of Nigeria which found Article 22(3) limits
on liability unbreakable.  Referring to Article 22(5), it noted, in pertinent part:
It is important and noteworthy that the above paragraph excluded para-
graph 3 which deals with liability in the case of carriage of cargo.  The
clear intention to exclude carriage of cargo is confirmed by article 30
which deals with actions brought against a servant or agent of the carrier.
They are also entitled to the limits of liability under the Convention just
as the carrier . . . . By these provisions negligence or willful misconduct
seem to play no role in the case of carriage of cargo under the Montreal
Convention.
Emirate Airline v. Tochukwu Aforka & Anor, [2014] LPELR-22686 (CA)
(Nigeria).
172. Bayer Corp. v. British Airways, LLC, 210 F.3d 236, 239 (4th Cir. 2000).
173. Article 57(b) provides that the Convention does not apply to “the car-
riage of persons, cargo and baggage for its military authorities on aircraft regis-
tered in or leased by that State Party, the whole capacity of which has been
reserved by or on behalf of such authorities.”  Montreal Convention art. 57(b).
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the care and disposition of dead service members.174  For example,
each body has an escort (preferably from the same unit as the de-
ceased) who is responsible for staying with the body from the time
it is loaded onto the plane to the time it is handed over to the party
designated to receive the remains.  The escort carries all documen-
tation.175  Similarly, airlines could appoint special employees to ac-
company human remains if the family cannot designate a
responsible party.  This mirrors the military escort practice and
would ensure some level of accountability, which seems reasonable
when dealing with such special transportation.  Of course, there
may be additional costs if the airline appoints a special employee,
but this overall cost would be far less than the cost of potential
litigation.  This would also solve the problem of plaintiffs having to
declare a higher value for human remains as contemplated by the
Convention.  Moreover, it is unlikely that many human remains will
be transported without an accompanying relative in the first place.
Finally, there is one more approach which runs counter to the
central thesis of this paper that merits mentioning here.  That is,
doing nothing and leaving any solution to market forces, i.e., lais-
sez-faire economics.  This approach may be attractive to those who
oppose more regulations on the airline industry or those who often
decry the perceived intrusive nature of federal courts into regulated
industries.  This approach begets the following questions:  Why
should the courts get involved in the Montreal Convention?  Why
not allow the signatories to the Convention to figure things out?
Despite the superficial logic of doing nothing, this approach is
flawed in two respects.  First, federal courts are already involved in
resolving disputes regarding the Convention.176  Second, this ap-
proach eludes the issue:  the Montreal Convention’s classification of
human remains as ordinary cargo and application of ordinary cargo
recovery rules is inhuman and absurd.  Doing nothing is tanta-
mount to saying there is no problem.  That is an approach this au-
thor cannot countenance.
CONCLUSION
This paper began with the story of a southern California father
seeking damages for pain and suffering resulting from the misiden-
tification of his son’s body.  It notes that even though domestic
courts provide remedies for emotional distress caused by the mis-
174. See DEP’T OF THE ARMY, ARMY MORTUARY AFFAIRS PROGRAM, ARMY
REG. 638.2 (Nov 28, 2016) (on file with author).
175. Id.
176. See Federal cases, infra Part V.
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handling of human remains, the Montreal Convention excludes any
such recovery, limiting the damages to the weight of the decedent
and casket multiplied by the prevailing SDR.  In a nutshell, this pa-
per’s main argument is as follows:  the Montreal Convention’s clas-
sification of human remains as ordinary cargo, requiring the
application of ordinary cargo rules, is both inhuman and absurd.
This absurdity is exemplified by disparities in “worth.”  With dam-
ages dependent on the weight of human remains and casket or
container, heavier persons in heavier caskets are worth more than
lighter persons in lighter caskets.
This paper acknowledges that a change in the Convention is
likely impracticable.  However, it suggests that federal courts can
use their power of interpretation of treaties to avoid the absurdities
and anomalous results.  It also calls on airlines to use common
sense measures that would ensure timely delivery of human re-
mains with less risk of causing emotional pain and suffering.  To
paraphrase the title, although death can be strange, it need not be
in the Montreal Convention.
